KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

It seems that detection is one area where science and technology could contribute but has not very well; we are still kind of in the Dark Ages. Is that a fair assessment?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answer

My reaction is that we have got to be vigilant, hard-working, and lucky. Technology can help us, both in safeguards and in discovering threats, but we are far short of having a fail- safe system.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Questions

What would you suggest to improve it? I will give you one example: Years ago skyjacking was a big problem. Now we have metal detectors in airports, and it is a nonexistent problem. Is there anything like this in our business coming up?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answers

I think your example is a good one, because it is a testament to the advantage of a technological solution to a threat and its inadequacy, because clearly those detection systems have been defeated. There have been some examples in which the threat has materialized into some outright harm and tragedy.

We are trying to bring scientific capability in our laboratories to bear on this problem in a more focused and budget-supported way. That is what I mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding on Counterproliferation. We are also attempting to invest more in our laboratories' capabilities to transfer those technologies into the former Soviet Union states. This is not something for which technology or investment alone is going to provide a solution.

Essentially, the fundamental solution lies in the hearts of men and women and in their intentions. What we hope for as a people is success for our diplomatic efforts and for the progress of human nature, for which history does not give us a lot of confidence, or trust. It is obviously a combination of all things. What we can do is address those things that we can address. In the Department of Energy, that involves making a more focused and coordinated investment in bringing our technological assets to bear on what we refer to as this "urgent opportunity."

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answers

Well, for the most part, it is not detection and prevention but deterrence which is the keystone of our security in the nuclear area. As long as we are dealing with other states it more or less works: Even if a state goes nuclear, it does not mean that they are going to automatically be in a condition to use those weapons, and specifically not likely against ourselves.

That breaks down when you have a kamikaze when you have people willing to commit suicide as part of the game. Deterrence is not a feature there. When we are talking about capabilities of individuals and smaller groups, it is a totally new ball game. For some of them, nuclear weapons figures in that. Others have the industrial capacity, and that is a pretty formidable threshold. When you have the breakdown of the Russian economy, we are seeing all kinds of possibilities and the likelihood of leakage of materials. We can potentially see nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups, too.

In the nuclear field there is some room for detection. There are devices that can spot weapons or weapons material in transport. It is much more difficult in the chemical and biological area it is next to impossible. I think what happened in Japan illustrates that. Here we have a private religious fanatical group, and the scale of it is so impressive. They had tens if not hundreds of tons of material sequestered away, and in ordinary civilian life. So I just do not see much possibility for detection.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

In summary, in chemical and biological concerns it is almost hopeless; wherein in nuclear, it is better. In Iraq it was not better in nuclear; it was disastrous, was it not?.

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answer

I think we had deterrence to back us up. That is, even if Iraq were to have a nuclear weapon, they would not be about to use it the next day.

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answer

I would like to state the obvious, but it is an important obvious to call attention to. The nuclear danger has grown very differently and very significantly. It is not deterrent- treatable, when we are talking about a nuclear danger associated with nuclear materials insecurity that can dribble out and get into the hands of subnational and terrorist groups that are not subject to deterrence in such matters.

Russia claims to have over 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, distributed among almost 100 facilities in the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation has relied on a security system of guards, guns, and gates, but largely made up of the Communist Party surveillance mechanisms as well as restriction of movement in that society.

With the happy breakdown of the Communist Party, however, we estimate as much as a 50 percent loss of the security system on nuclear materials in the Soviet Union, as restrictions of movement and the Communist Party breakdown have occurred. This is a very serious equation when it takes only 15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium this is against a 1,200- metric ton universe of material to make a bomb the size of Nagasaki.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

So are you saying, Secretary Curtis, that you think there is a lot of nuclear material out there unaccounted for?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answer

One of the interesting aspects of the Soviet system is that because they had such a disciplined and rigorous control of movement and people, as well as guards, guns, and gates, they did not rely (as we do) on inventory controls and technological tools such as perimeter monitoring. The reality is that the Russian Federation really cannot account for its nuclear materials security, because it has never done the type of inventory work that has been characteristic of our security system. The answer is yes. It is not accounted for in the sense that we use that term. I think it should be very worrisome to us all.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Questions

Where are the Russians' biological weapons scientists, and what are they doing now? Where are their weapons? What do we know about how their program is being dismantled?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answers

Those are intelligence questions that would have to be dealt with at different levels of confidentiality. I will quote the public statements that have been made on this matter. The Russian biological weapon program was very extensive. It continued for many years in abject violation of the Soviet Union's commitments under the Biological Disarmament Convention. President Yeltsin has acknowledged as much. It seems very likely that he is not in control of, or fully aware of, the residuals of these programs that now exist.

The estimates that I have seen would say that it is not an active production program and that it has been mostly disassembled, but we cannot be sure of that. We do not know where the stockpiles are. There is still an infrastructure. The individuals who were in charge of those activities are still on the payroll, and they are still doing something. There has been less than avid cooperation in sharing information, either about past history or current events in that residual within the military. I have talked to many of their biological scientists, people at the institutes, and people who used to work for the military in these programs. They are very open about what they had done and what they are not doing at the present time. They will also say that what is going on inside the Ministry of Defense is still a closed book to everybody, and it is to us. I think that is where we are right now.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Questions

If we had to divide the threats from the former Soviet Union into nuclear weapons, unauthorized attack; nuclear material, unaccounted for; and biological and chemical weapons, either unauthorized attack or unaccounted for; how would you stack those up? Which do you worry about most, and which do you worry about least?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answers

I would rank them in reverse order. I would worry less about loose nukes. I think the weapons of the former Soviet Union are by and large under good protection and security, including the dismantling product of that. I would worry more about nuclear material, and I would worry most about what sometimes we refer to as "cheap nukes," or the biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Chemical weapons would be the number-one worry -- in terms of seeing a world that is threatened more by terrorism and subnational groups than by strategic confrontation among nations.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

If the Tokyo attack had happened here, what would have happened?

FRANK E. YOUNG Answer

I think you saw what would occur here, just the same as you saw in Japan. Japan has an excellent medical system and an excellent response. That type of action would be very similar. You would see the first few hours of chaos followed with death and morbidity and the attempt to move in and to mitigate that as rapidly as possible. You would mobilize individuals to the perimeter, as they did to bring individuals to the hospital, to stabilize them, and to focus on doing no harm until you know what is going on. That was essentially what they did.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

Can we expect more and more of these as the years go on?

FRANK E. YOUNG Answer

I can give you some data. Following the death in 1986 of Diane Elsroth from cyanide poisoning, there were a large number of copycats, so one always wonders and worries about copycats. The tendency to see one event followed by others is high. Having said that, I think the good news is that there is always a lot more focus on deterrence and prevention.

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answer

Deterrence is the threat of retribution, and I think we are seeing some of that right now. I think the very efficient way in which the Japanese federal police are getting after those people is setting an object lesson: This is not something that any person or group can do and expect to get off free. When you have a suicidal bent and such fanaticism, that may only carry you so far. I do not want to underestimate that aspect as well. No, there is no way to prevent such an attack. You are not going to be able to search everybody coming onto the subway system during the very crowded commuter hours.

If they are prepared there were only six fatalities; there were only 500-odd casualties that had to be taken to the hospital. On that scale, that is within the zone of capability of a municipal health system and local resources and the police.

You have to envision the possibility (and I shudder to have to say this) of a thousand times larger level; I will not even mention a million times larger.

Suppose it had been 6,000 dead, 100,000 people in perilous condition. Your local authorities cannot begin to cope with events of that kind. That is where Frank comes in.

FRANK E. YOUNG Answer

That is absolutely correct. When we look at this, our focus is exactly on the catastrophic focus on injury so when we play our earthquake scenarios, we are looking at those exact type of numbers that Josh deals with, because we have to be prepared to meet the local needs and to organize and mobilize the federal response.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Questions

Looking out into the future, do you see any possibility that there will be detection of dangerous chemicals? Or are there just too many? Are we ever going to get a situation where we know where they are?

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answers

Would you now spend several hundred million dollars to equip all the transit systems in the country with mass spectrometers or similar devices that could have picked up the sarin leaking from the lunch boxes in Japan? Then knowing that you have done that well, a few years later on, there would be counter-technology, different chemicals, some other way to get past it. And, yes, one could then refine further devices, but at what cost?

So I say, what are the kinds of things that would not cost as much in turmoil, confusion, and development of anxiety, and could they have other purposes? There are things that can be done at quite modest expense: We can equip our medical facilities to have the right antidotes available, to have the knowledge there, to have a mobilizable team like the NEST teams available in this area this could go a very long way, and for a tiny fraction of the cost mentioned. We could at least see enough damage mitigation, that we could say,"Well, at least we did that part of it."

FRANK E. YOUNG Answers

To pick up upon what Josh said, that is the basics of the National Disaster Medical System, which is a partnership between the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and FEMA. We have 4,200 private sector physicians, nurses, and support individuals that can be called into federal service in about six hours of call-up time. They are strategically located around the nation and can be moved anywhere. There are VA and DOD assets. Consequence management is where we have focused at this time. I would concur with Josh that detection, while it can be done, is at this point very expensive. As technology goes on, detection may become more cost-effective. At least for now I would focus on preparedness and consequence management.

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answers

We really do not know what our technical capabilities usefully applied can produce; it depends on the applications that you would apply those technologies to. For example, portal screening type of devices are very interesting technologies under development that are molecule identification sniffers that could contribute to our security in certain applications. It would not have protected against something like happened in Japan. This strikes me that there is no fail-safe system here and you could make progress only at the margin. Experience is that people are careless, and subnational terrorist groups have been particularly careless. If you can marry up technology, hard work, intelligence, and luck, you may actually get something out of this. Certainly it is worth the effort.

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answers

It is the operational aspects of deployment, of say, screening technology rather than the technology itself. Just try to visualize how you go about doing it, the kind of delay and interference with quick movement and so on that it would impose that is the issue more than whether you could have technology.

If you had a system where everybody entering the subway system had to stand in line, one at a time, and go through the equivalent of a metal detector, yes, there are sniffer technologies that could pick up most of the chemical agents. They would not pick up any of the biological ones, unfortunately, and we would have to foresee yet another technological device. The net result in interference with our daily lives is what I had in mind as much as the cost of the technologies per se. If these events became endemic, then, yes, that is what we would come to.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

I thought your point was not only the cost and the inconvenience to daily life, but also the low probability of detection of a lot of these chemicals, anyway. Am I right?

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answer

That just says there is another technical challenge, and if you were really intent you know, made a major priority about going after them, yes, I agree with Mr. Curtis. You can put a lot of focus on this type of technology. The technologies are moving very rapidly, but there is an inconvenience in life; you balance off the risk-benefit analysis. At the present time the focus is more on the ability to respond than on the ability to detect not diminishing the importance of detection, but looking at what the issues are when you are faced with a vulnerability and a very low risk at this moment. When you look at all the things facing us, this is still a relatively low risk per 100,000 population.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

Let me ask one question to Secretary Curtis. Are you putting any money into this kind of detection right now?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answer

Yes.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Question

What is the most promising area?

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answer

I think the molecular identification with sniffers and a combination of mass spectrographic work. I do not know how much of this is in the public domain and how much of it is not, but that is the area of promise that we are investing in.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Questions

Thank you. I would ask each member of the panel to give your final thoughts on this area: What is the role of science and technology in precluding these kind of disasters we have talked about? What words of advice would you leave us with?

JOSHUA LEDERBERG Answers

I am still going to focus on remediation, because I think these are technologies which are equally important in coping with natural outbreaks of disease and those which are initiated by malicious action. We have still got a long way to go in coping with viral disease. There are possibilities of intervention; there is a considerable amount of very basic research going on that gives very exciting prospects and possibilities.

We may have to make some changes in center structures to have appropriate industrial involvement. Last year, zero new antibacterial agents were approved by the FDA. It has not been a popular arena for private investment in the pharmaceutical industry, at a time when we are seeing a resurgence of organisms which are becoming ever more drug-resistant.

The level of pharmaceutical investment has gone way down in that area. So those are the general kinds of issues of technology I would put the first emphasis on. We do need them.

There are many other elements to it, as Secretary Curtis very correctly points to what the sniffers can do. I want to be sure that we have sniffer technology in mobile platforms capable of coming quickly to a scene of disaster within a couple of hours and tell us at least what the agents were.

Dr. Young has talked appropriately about some very reassuring plans that are in the offing, but they still have quite a ways to go for their full materialization.

CHARLES B. CURTIS Answers

I think that science and technology can contribute to security in this area, but it cannot provide it. It is an element of a multifaced effort. I want to emphasize again the component of human intelligence to this process. That has been a very important part of our ability to deal with subnational terrorism. There is a lot of very dangerous conventional stuff out there that does not have any of the exotic characteristics of what we have been talking about. It can make a big mess, and so this is just a part of a much larger picture. I think science and technology can make a very significant contribution to it.

FRANK E. YOUNG Answers

Catastrophic disasters with terrorism of chemicals and biological agents is no different (other than compressed and in highest magnitude) than what goes on in nature. Josh focused on the variety of different infectious agents that have come out: We have seen antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis, the emergence of AIDS, and other infectious diseases. The platform of fundamental research to respond to those activities is there.

Ten thousand or more chemical disasters occur in the nation per year. What we are looking at in this type of a disaster is the ability to prevent by appropriate detection with the intelligence community, but then the need to respond expeditiously and with a measured response to what the local needs are and to then come in, detect what you have on the scene, devise appropriate therapies, get public information out, and clean it up afterwards. It is a fundamental discipline.

Going back to the early years of recombinant DNA, the question was: Does what we see in the laboratory occur in nature? The fundamental issue is that there are harmful chemicals and organisms around us. Those same measures of response, natural and manmade, need to be able to swiftly move in at the time of an outbreak of disease.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN Summary

Thank you very much. Let me on behalf of the audience and Jane Wales and others, thank very much Professor Lederberg, Secretary Curtis, and Dr. Young for coming. It was a wonderful, wonderful discussion, and your opening remarks were short and crisp. I thought the discussion was very good. Let me on behalf of the panel thank everybody here in the audience. The questions were outstanding; looking over the list of participants, it is a real honor for all of us to speak to such a wonderful audience. Thank you very much.

President and First Lady | Vice President and Mrs. Gore
Record of Progress | The Briefing Room
Gateway to Government | Contacting the White House
White House for Kids | White House History
White House Tours | Help | Text Only

Privacy Statement