Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Samuel Berger
For Immediate Release November 18, 1999


The Conrad Hotel
Istanbul, Turkey

7:00 P.M. (L)

MR. BERGER: Now, I get so little respect from Leavy that he doesn't even introduce me. (Laughter.)

Let me give you a readout on the meeting between President Yeltsin and President Clinton. It was a vigorous meeting, the two Presidents expressing strong convictions. They expressed their views on Chechnya, not too dissimilar from what you heard in the plenary session.

The hallmark of this relationship, however, has been the willingness of President Yeltsin and President Clinton to work through difficult issues. And I don't know that we convinced President Yeltsin on Chechnya -- he certainly didn't convince us that the course that they're on is not -- is likely to succeed. But I do think it was useful for President Yeltsin to be here today to hear the voices of the international -- his colleagues, which were quite uniform in expressing their concerns, not hostilely toward Russia, but out of concern for the impact that this could have on Russia.

The meeting, however, was, I think, cordial in its tone. It ended -- it actually both began and ended by President Yeltsin telling President Clinton that he owed him a visit to Moscow. At the end, saying that he hoped he would get him a date soon for coming to Moscow to continue the dialogue sometime next year. We will look at our schedule.

Now, on Chechnya, as I said it was quite consistent in essence with the exchange you heard this morning. President Yeltsin said that Russia is under the threat of what he described as "merciless terrorists;" that they were in favor of peace, but that that was only possible by eliminating the terrorists. He said that their intent is not to harm civilians, but that this -- that the rebels in Chechnya not only were indigenous, but also were increasingly being supported by radical fundamentalists from the region.

The President said to him that we don't disagree on the need to combat terrorism, but said that -- and that we would be prepared to work with Russia on cutting off resources to terrorist organizations, particularly international terrorist organizations -- but that we feel that the situation on the ground here is such that the civilians and rebels are intermingled, and makes it very difficult to avoid civilian casualties. Therefore, the President said, the means that you're using will undermine your ends, and lead to a cycle of violence. And that's why we're urging a political dialogue to achieve a political settlement. Again, this was, I would say, at least half the meeting, discussing Chechnya.

But on other subjects, they talked about arms control. They reviewed the recent exchange of letters that I mentioned to you yesterday on both nuclear reductions, the ABM treaty, NMD. I think the President clarified for President Yeltsin some legislation that he had signed last year which had some prefatory language about national missile defense, which Yeltsin believed reflected a firm decision on our part. The President explained, as I have here before, that he will decide this next year based on the four factors that I've talked about: threat, cost, technical feasibility, and the effect on arms control, and our overall security.

The President reiterated that the NMD systems that we're looking at are directed at rogue states -- maybe even, 10 years from now, terrorists who might have missiles; that Russia's own generals say they can overwhelm this system, and therefore it should not be a threat to their deterrence. They agreed to continue parallel discussions on START III and the ABM.

President Yeltsin raised the question of going further than we have before on dealing with plutonium stockpiles. He said he was increasingly concerned with this because of the risk that they could get in the hands of terrorists. We have had good cooperation with the Russians in this area in the past, and the President suggested that we have our experts discuss how we can intensify that.

President Yeltsin noted -- I would say with a little bit of irony in his voice -- that the Duma had approved the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the past several days. The President indicated that he believed, as he said before, that the Senate at some point will take this up again, and eventually will ratify the CTBT.

On the CFE agreement, they noted that we're in the final stages of negotiation, and the President indicated the importance of Russia concluding agreements with Georgia and Moldova relating to agreement to withdraw their forces from those two countries, something that we have been urging the Russians to do now for quite sometime. Those negotiations are going on here in Istanbul; hopefully, they will reach a successful conclusion. I think they're at a quite advanced stage.

And then some discussion of the upcoming elections. The President talked about how important that was, the succession of democracy from one leader to another. Yeltsin described the political process underway, and the President underscored that elections and democracy were the key to Russia's transformation and would be an historic moment for Russia.

And, again, as I say, the conversation ended -- I think the meeting lasted about an hour, and the conversation ended with President Yeltsin saying, come to Russia and we will continue this discussion for three days.

Q Sandy, in the end, did President Yeltsin yield any ground? We had a German diplomat saying that he's agreed to allow the OSCE head into Chechnya, and has agreed to work for a political solution. Are you aware of any concessions that he made or any ground --

MR. BERGER: He left Foreign Minister Ivanov behind. He said, Mr. Ivanov will negotiate with your ministers. The foreign ministers have been meeting this afternoon and I believe Secretary Albright may be by in a bit to bring you up to date on where those discussions go.

Let me simply frame that -- tomorrow, there are three possible documents that will be signed. One is, as I've said before, the CFE agreement. Two is the OSCE Charter, which we talked about before. And three is a declaration.

In the declaration, we have proposed some language relating to OSCE engagement in Chechnya. That is what's being discussed. It's obviously a consensus document; therefore, the Russians would have to agree to it. And I think I'll leave to Secretary Albright -- and I think she'll be by shortly -- to describe where that is.

Q The President said, in talking about an OSCE negotiations, that there were people other than terrorists that --

MR. BERGER: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.

Q The President said, with respect to the OSCE negotiations, that if the Russians would agree to it, there were people other than terrorists in Chechnya that could be negotiated with. President Yeltsin's remarks seemed to say that his argument was not with people who want to talk peace, but with the people -- with the terrorists themselves. Was there any movement inside the meeting? Any discussion? Any attempt to identify a group of people that the two could sit down and talk with?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think that's an important -- that, in general terms, was discussed. I mean, President Yeltsin said, I will not negotiate with terrorists, with bandits. And he described, in some detail, the activities of some of these groups in Chechnya, and the support they receive from outside interests, outside terrorist groups, et cetera.

The President said, I'm not talking about negotiating with terrorists. I'm talking about negotiating with those people in Chechnya who seek to have a peaceful resolution, and isolating the terrorists. And, again, President Yeltsin didn't say -- there was no agreement on that, but I think to the extent that President Yeltsin was here today and heard what President Clinton said, heard what Chancellor Schroeder said, heard what Mr. Ahtisaari said and others that were after us, hopefully that will push him down the road toward seeking a political solution.

Q Sandy, is there an analogy here? Maybe it's a poor one, but Yeltsin would negotiate -- let's take the Northern Ireland example -- he would negotiate with somebody like Sinn Fein but not with the IRA, is that the idea?

MR. BERGER: I think -- I've learned never to use metaphors -- (laughter) -- so I can't even use analogies. But I think the concept here I agree with, which is we're not suggesting that he should sit down with those forces in Chechnya who are, in fact, killing innocent people, have attacked Dagestan, who have been engaged in terrorist activities. I don't think anybody disputes the fact that Chechnya is a haven for terrorists and secessionists. But there are certainly other forces in Chechnya -- it's not for me to describe them or designate them who want this over, who want peace.

One of the reasons we would like to see some greater OSCE role -- again, I don't think it's the be-all and the end-all, but an intermediary here may be able to help create that dialogue.

Q Can you please enlighten us on the circumstances -- could you please explain the circumstances of Yeltsin's departure? There have been conflicting reports about this. Did he leave when he planned to leave? Did he leave early because he was angry about the Chechnya part of the declaration?

MR. BERGER: I spoke to my opposite number and President Chirac before coming over here to make sure that I understood the dynamic. President Yeltsin had always planned to arrive last night and leave today. That had always been his intention. The meeting with President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder, according to French government officials who were in the meeting, was very cordial, brief.

President Yeltsin said, I want to focus on a time when we can meet -- I think he said in Paris -- for a whole day and talk about European security issues and these issues. And they reached an agreement to a meeting, I think, sometime in December, and had a brief discussion and left not at all on an angry note. Whether that was by virtue of pressing business in Moscow or stamina or what, I can't speculate. But it was not stomping out of the room.

Q Your assessment on today's meeting between the Prime Minister and President Clinton -- Simitis and Ecevit -- sees both sides express a kind of satisfaction --

MR. BERGER: I'm pleased that the two foreign ministers met again. I believe this is the fourth time -- Simitis and Ecevit
-- I'm very pleased that they met, as is the President. I think it's appropriate for them to comment on the substance of their meeting, not for me. But, in general, as we've said before, we find this general thawing of relations to be very, very hopeful.

Q Sandy, I know Secretary Albright's coming, but could you describe the flavor of the Chechnya language in the charter?

MR. BERGER: No, I really -- she's been in these negotiations representing the President, and both is more familiar with the language and I think it's more appropriate for her to -- I'm not trying to duck anything, I just think it's more appropriate -- she'll be better able to answer your questions, I think.

Q You said the President spoke about the impact of the Chechnya crisis continuing and the status quo would have on Russia. What did he say about what that --

MR. BERGER: I'm sorry, for some reason I'm having a hard time tonight hearing you.

Q You said that the President spoke with Yeltsin about the impact that a continuation of the Chechnya crisis at its current stage would have on Russia. What impact did he describe, and how is it that it will have some serious impact on Russia if, in all the bilateral relationships with other countries, it doesn't seem to have had a serious impact?

MR. BERGER: First of all, internally, there's an awful lot of resources that Russia is now expending on this conflict in Chechnya -- resources that obviously are needed for its domestic economy. So, number one, it's a diversion of resources, it's a diversion of the focus and attention of Russian government officials, and the greater degree of instability that is created in the Northern Caucasus -- this is a problem that could spread rather than be contained by continuing conflict.

So I think the President is referring in particular, and more importantly to Russia, to the effect on Russia -- in Russia.

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Briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

Briefing by National Security Advisor Samuel Berger

Briefing by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson

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